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Fourth Amendment Protections and
the Emergency Exception
State v. Resler, 209 Neb. 249, 306 N.W.2d 918 (1981).
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the heart
of the fourth amendment' concerns the protection of a citizen's
right to privacy.2 The importance of this protection is greatest
when the area sought to be protected is the home.3
The fourth amendment guarantees are secured through the
warrant requirement.4 Searches conducted without a warrant are
1. U.S. CONST. amend IV. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967), in which the Court
stated. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection ...
[whereas] what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public may be constitutionally protected." See also Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). For a discussion of the development of the fourth
amendment protection of privacy interests, see Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MmN. L REv. 349 (1974). For recent cases discuss-
ing the standing requirements for asserting a fourth amendment claim relat-
ing to violation of a legitimate expectation of privacy, see Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
3. "A greater burden is placed ... on officials who enter a home or dwelling
without consent. Freedom from intrusion into the home or dwelling is the
archetype of the privacy protection secured by the Fourth Amendment."
Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385,389 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cited with approval
in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980) (New York statute allowing
warrantless entry into dwelling house to effect routine felony arrest declared
unconstitutional).
4. See Mincey v. United States, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). The Court in Mincey stated:
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support
of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence.
Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by
a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the of-
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'"per se unreasonable."5
However, to allow law enforcement officials to deal practically
with various circumstances, the Court has declared that the fourth
amendment warrant requirement is "subject... to a few specifi-
cally established and well-delineated exceptions." 6 The generally
recognized exceptions are: search incident to arrest,7 stop and
frisk,8 automobile, 9 and hot pursuit. 10 In addition, the Court ac-
cepts warrantless searches conducted with consent" and allows
the seizure of evidence discovered in plain view.12 The exceptions
are based upon the premise that the need for immediate police ac-
tion outweighs the usual warrant requirement.13
ficer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime."
Id. at 395 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)).
5. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (" [S] earches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment...
6. Id.
7. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search conducted incident to
lawful arrest must be confined to the area in immediate control of the defend-
ant). But cf. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (lawful custodial arrest
of occupant of automobile allows search of automobile passenger compart-
ment as search incident to arrest).
8. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk legal where officers reason-
ably concluded suspect might be armed and dangerous).
9. See United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982) (under automobile exception,
police may search every part of the vehicle they have probable cause to be-
lieve may contain the object of their search); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583
(1974) (warrantless search following impoundment of automobile left in pub-
lic parking lot upheld); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (warrantless
search of automobile at police station was justified when occupants had been
previously arrested on public highway).
10. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (police could pursue women
who sought refuge within house upon their approach); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967) (delay to obtain warrant not required during criminal in-
vestigation where danger requires immediate action).
11. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent searches al-
lowed where examination of the totality of the circumstances showed the
consent to have been voluntarily given).
12. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The Court explained the
rationale for the plain view doctrine as follows:
What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer
in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course
of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incrimi-
nating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior jus-
tification-whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit,
search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for
being present unconnected with a search directed against the ac-
cused-and permits the warrantless seizure.
Id. at 466.
13. See id. at 455. See also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948),
wherein the Court stated:
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In addition to the above exceptions, lower federal and state
courts14 have recognized the "emergency exception."15 This ex-
ception may be summarized as follows:
[T]he Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of
the police before they violate the privacy of the home. We cannot be
true to that constitutional requirement and excuse the absence of a
search warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption
from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation
made that course imperative.
14. The Supreme Court has not adopted the emergency exception.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Dunavan, 485 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1973) (after man
sent to hospital, law enforcement officers searched motel room for medical
information); United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1972) (po-
lice entered hotel room after reported fight); Vauss v. United States, 370 F.2d
250 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (police found unconscious man on public street and
searched to secure identification); United States v. Herndon, 390 F. Supp. 1017
(S.D. Fla. 1975) (police entered house after report of sound of gunshots);
Steigler v. Anderson, 360 F. Supp. 1286 (D. Del. 1973), aff'd, 496 F.2d 793 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1002 (1974) (police entered burning house to look
for possible victims); Stevens v. State, 443 P.2d 600 (Alaska 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1039 (1969) (police entered home after report of shooting); State v.
Sainz, 18 Ariz. App. 358, 501 P.2d 1199 (1972) (police entered home after wo-
man reported son chasing her with a knife); People v. Hill, 12 Cal. 3d 731, 528
P.2d 1, 117 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1974) (police enter home to investigate shooting
incident due to possibility of others injured); Patrick v. State, 227 A.2d 486
(Del. 1967) (police officers informed by victim's employer that victim was
dead or dying from head wound); Gilbert v. State, 289 So. 2d 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1974) (person threatening suicide justified warrantless search of jacket);
Webster v. State, 201 So. 2d 789 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (police entered home
after viewing motionless person through window); People v. Kepi, 65 11. App.
3d 327, 382 N.E.2d 642 (1978) (shooting incident raised suspicions that another
person may have been shot and was in apartment searched without warrant);
People v. Lovitz, 39 111. App. 3d 624,350 N.E.2d 276 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
842 (1977) (police entered home due to odor of decaying flesh); Maxey v.
State, 251 Ind. 645, 244 N.E.2d 650 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 949 (1970)
(mother of appellant asked police to enter); State v. Boyle, 207 Kan. 833, 486
P.2d 849 (1971) (presence of dynamite prompted call to police for help); State
v. Hills, 283 So. 2d 220 (La. 1973) (police followed screaming woman into
apartment containing stolen goods); People v. Schrantz, 50 Mich. App. 227,213
N.W.2d 257 (1973) (police enter home due to screams followed by continued
inability to contact woman thought to be in house with defendant); State v.
Miller, 486 S.W.2d 435 (Mo. 1972) (police searched jacket of unconscious
man); Geary v. State, 91 Nev. 784, 544 P.2d 417 (1975) (police entered apart-
ment after observing overturned furniture and bloodstains in apartment);
People v. Somas, 68 Misc. 2d 450, 327 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1972) (police found chil-
dren alone in apartment); State v. Martin, 274 N.W.2d 893 (S.D.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 883 (1979) (police entered defendant's home after social worker re-
ported a killing by his client); Hunter v. State, 496 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. Crim. App.
1973) (police searched defendant's home after defendant admitted recent
killing to another); Corbett v. State, 493 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131 (1974) (police entered home after person admitted
killing to another); State v. Sanders, 8 Wash. App. 306, 506 P.2d 892 (1973)
(police looked into apartment and saw defendant swaying back and forth
without regard to repeated knocking on door); State v. Pires, 55 Wis. 2d 597,
1982]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Law enforcement officers may enter private premises without either an
arrest or a search warrant to preserve life or property, to render first aid
and assistance, or to conduct a general inquiry into an unsolved crime,
provided they have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an urgent
need for such assistance and protective action ... and provided, further,
that they do not enter with an accompanying intent to either arrest or
search. 16
In a recent case of first impression, State v. Resler,'7 the Ne-
braska Supreme Court recognized the validity of the emergency
exception in a medical assistance context. This Note will examine
the emergency exception as adopted and applied by the Nebraska
Supreme Court, and discuss the extent to which the exception
comports with fourth amendment guarantees.
H. THE RESLER DECISION
On the evening of December 10, 1979, the police responded to a
call regarding a prowler at an apartment complex.' 8 An officer ar-
rived at the scene and was investigating the complaint when a shot
was fired.'9
Apparently, before the police arrived, a different tenant in the
apartment complex had observed a prowler outside his window.20
This tenant obtained his .22 calibre rifle and followed the prowler.
After observing the prowler enter an apartment, he waited behind
a fence for the prowler to reappear. When the prowler came out,
the tenant warned him to stop or be shot. The prowler then started
running, and the tenant fired a shot at him.2 ' The prowler fell to
his knees, but he immediately got back on his feet and continued
running.22
By this time, the officer who had responded to the complaint
arrived at the scene of the shooting. He and the tenant were joined
201 N.W.2d 153 (1972) (police officers entered bedroom after finding out that
all parties had been transported to hospital).
16. Mascolo, The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Requirement
Under the Fourth Amendment, 22 BFFALO L. REV. 419, 426 (1973).
17. 209 Neb. 249, 306 N.W.2d 918 (1981).
18. Id. at 250,.306 N.W.2d at 920. The apartment complex was a series of 16 free-
standing rowhouse style buildings in two parallel lines. Each building con-
tained three or four separate units. At the rear of each apartment was a
sliding glass patio door opening onto a patio deck. The complainant had
called in regard to noises she had heard in the lower level of her apartment.
Brief of Appellant at 7, State v. Resler, 209 Neb. 249, 306 N.W.2d 918 (1981).
19. Brief of Appellant at 7.
20. 209 Neb. at 251, 306 N.W.2d at 920.
21. Brief of Appellee at 6.
22. 209 Neb. at 251, 306 N.W.2d at 921. It was not known whether the prowler fell
to his knees because he had been shot or because he was trying to elude
gunfire. Id.
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by two other civilians in a chase down the street after the prowler 23
until the prowler jumped a picket fence and the pursuers lost sight
of him.24
The tenant who had shot at the prowler identified him as an
occupant of another of the apartment units.25 Although two police
cruisers searched the area for a time following the chase, the
prowler was not found.26
After reorganizing outside of the alleged prowler's apartment,2 7
the officers placed a call to an investigator in the police department
who had asked that he be informed of any incidents relating to the
alleged prowler.28 When the investigator arrived, he was briefed of
the events that had occurred. Witnesses stated that they had not
noticed any unusual activity around the apartment.2 9 No lights
were on, although the apartment door was standing open.30 At this
point, the investigator decided to enter the apartment to render
23. Id.
24. Brief of Appellant at 9.
25. 209 Neb at 251, 306 N.W.2d at 921. The neighbor who had fired at the prowler
testified that he recognized the prowler as a tenant of the defendant's apart-
ment, although at the time of the chase he did not know him by name. The
neighbor's knowledge was based on having seen the defendant coming in and
out of the apartment and working on his automobile near the apartment. Id.
26. Brief of Appellant at 10-11. In addition, an officer on foot searched the area
for five or six minutes but did not find the prowler. Id. at 10.
27. 209 Neb. at 251, 306 N.W.2d at 921. An investigator called to the scene later
testified that he knew the apartment belonged to the defendant. Brief of Ap-
pellant at 14. However, the police officers thought that the defendant was
living with his mother in the northern part of the city. Brief of Appellee at 8.
28. 209 Neb. at 251, 306 N.W.2d at 921. Investigator Steven Murphy had requested
that officers notify him of any incidents involving the defendant because the
defendant was a suspect in a series of unsolved offenses in Hastings that
Murphy was investigating. Id. at 250, 306 N.W.2d at 920.
29. Brief of Appellant at 13-14. The defendant's apartment was located next to
the apartment of the initial complainant. Brief of Appellee at 7. The com-
plainant had dressed and gone outside after the shot was fired. She was out-
doors in the vicinity of the apartment during the entire investigation and saw
no activity. Brief of Appellant at 11-12. Also, the initial responding officer
returned to the area of the apartment after losing sight of the prowler while
the police cruisers conducted a search and saw no activity in the defendant's
apartment. Id. at 12.
30. Brief of Appellee at 8. Although the decision does not discuss the possibility
of justifying the intrusion on the basis of necessity to secure property, such
intrusions have been recognized by the lower courts if the facts suggest an
emergency threat to property. See United States v. Zurosky, 614 F.2d 779 (1st
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 967 (1980) (warrantless search justified when
police observed suspicious activity by person inside a lighted warehouse in
early morning hours). But see United States v. Selberg, 630 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.
1980) (open door without suspicions of criminal activity within did not justify
entry to secure property). For a summary of cases involving warrantless en-
tries to protect property, see Note, The Emergency Doctrine, Civil Search and
Seizure, and the Fourth Amendment, 43 FoRDHAm L. REv. 571, 584-588 (1975).
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medical aid to the prowler.31 No one was present in the apartment;
however, the officers observed in plain view, items they knew to be
connected with previous crimes.32
Based on the items observed in plain view, the officers obtained
a search warrant and seized the items on December 11, 1979.33 Fol-
lowing this seizure, an arrest warrant was issued, and Resler was
arrested sometime after December 11, 1979.34
The defendant entered a plea of not guilty to charges of bur-
glary, criminal attempt, and first degree forcible sexual assault.35
At a jury trial he was found guilty of four counts of burglary and
two counts of first degree forcible sexual assault.36 The defendant
appealed his conviction from the jury verdict to the Nebraska
Supreme Court, primarily asserting that the trial court erred in not
suppressing evidence seized under a search warrant issued on the
basis of items that had been observed in plain view during an ille-
gal entry into his apartment.3 7 This claim was based on the "fruit
of the poisonous tree"38 doctrine, which provides that evidence
must be excluded if it is obtained from, or closely connected with,
evidence obtained in an illegal search or seizure.39 In a unanimous
31. 209 Neb. at 252, 306 N.W.2d at 921. Investigator Murphy believed that the de-
fendant was shot and in need of first aid. Id.
32. Id. Testimony revealed that the officers saw a guitar in the kitchen and sev-
eral pairs of ladies panties in the living room and in one bedroom. Brief of
Appellee at 9. These items were linked to previous unsolved burglaries and
sexual assaults. 209 Neb. at 252, 306 N.W.2d at 921.
33. Id. A second search warrant was issued and served on December 13, 1979.
This warrant was required to seize additional items not covered by the first
search warrant. Id.
34. Id. at 257, 306 N.W.2d at 920. After the initial search of defendant's apartment
pursuant to the warrant, the officers went to the defendant's mother's home
to look for the defendant. Brief of Appellant at 15. Defendant was at his
mother's home and, although questioned, was not arrested until later. Id.
35. Brief of Appellant at 2.
36. 209 Neb. at 249, 306 N.W.2d at 920. The trial began on July 14, 1980 and was
concluded on July 15, 1980. Appellant was sentenced on October 9, 1980 to the
Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex for a term of not less than 6 years
nor more than 10 years on each conviction of burglary, and for a term of not
less than 10 years nor more than 15 years for each conviction of first degree
sexual assault, each sentence to be served concurrently. Id. at 249-50, 306
N.W.2d at 920. None of the burglary convictions were for the prowling inci-
dent of December 10-11, 1980. Brief of Appellant at 15-17.
37. 209 Neb. at 250, 306 N.W.2d at 920. Further assignments of error reviewed on
appeal were whether the trial court erred in not granting a motion for di-
rected verdict on the grounds of insufficient evidence and whether the
sentences imposed were excessive. The Nebraska Supreme Court found that
sufficient evidence existed upon which the jury could convict, and that the
trial court had not abused its sentencing discretion. Id. at 258-59, 306 N.W.2d
at 924-25.
38. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
39. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (a search cannot be justified
[Vol. 61:545
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decision, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the warrantless en-
try into the defendant's apartment based upon the "emergency ex-
ception" and affirmed the defendant's conviction.40
In reaching its decision, the court adopted emergency excep-
tion guidelines expressed in the two leading cases of Root v.
Gauper4l and People v. Mitchell.42 The Gauper case articulates
the recognized procedural guidelines for the application of the
emergency exception. These are as follows: (1) since the doctrine
is an exception to the ordinary fourth amendment requirement of
obtaining a warrant before entry into a home, the state has the
burden of proving that the warrantless entry fell within the excep-
tion; and (2) the police officer's belief that an emergency situation
existed, giving rise to the warrantless entry, should be tested by an
objective standard.4 3
The court in Mitchell enunciated the following three substan-
tive elements to be applied in determining if the situation justified
a warrantless emergency entrance:
(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an
emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the pro-
tection of life or property. (2) The search must not be primarily motivated
by intent to arrest or seize evidence. (3) There must be some reasonable
basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the
area or place to be searched.4 4
The Nebraska Supreme Court found that the facts in Resler sat-
by what it produces nor can a warrantless arrest without probable cause be
justified by who is, in fact, arrested). See also Byars v. United States, 273 U.S.
28 (1927) (materials seized were outside the scope of the search warrant);
Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree"Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALMF.
L. REV. 579 (1968); Note, The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Constitu-
tional Exclusionary Rules, 74 CoLum. L REV. 88 (1974).
40. 209 Neb. at 258, 306 N.W.2d at 924.
41. 438 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1971). In Gauper, the court held that the officers did not
have reason to believe an emergency existed at the time of entry where the
sheriff and town marshal knew prior to entering the house that the shooting
victim had been removed to the hospital, and no evidence suggested any
other persons were in need of aid.
42. 39 N.Y.2d 173,347 N.E.2d 607,383 N.Y.S.2d 246, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976).
The Mitchell court held that the emergency doctrine justified entry into the
defendant's hotel room to look for a hotel maid who disappeared shortly after
reporting to work.
43. Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 1971). Accord, Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 21-22, 27 (1968) (stop and frisk legal as officers reasonably concluded
person frisked might be armed and dangerous); United States v. Jeffers, 342
U.S. 48, 51 (1951) (seizure of narcotics was illegal where access to rooms was
gained in absence of defendant and occupants); McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948) (conviction for operating illegal lottery reversed as a
result of evidence obtained in illegal search).
44. People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 177-78, 347 N.E.2d 607, 609, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246,
248, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976), quoted in State v. Resler, 209 Neb. 249,
255, 306 N.W.2d 918, 923 (1981).
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isfied the Mitchell and Gauper principles. In determining that the
officers had a reasonable belief that an emergency existed, the
court relied on the facts that the defendant had fallen to the
ground when the shot was fired 45 and that the defendant's apart-
ment door was open without explanation.4 6 According to the court,
these facts supported the investigator's conclusion that the de-
fendant was wounded and had returned to the apartment too weak
to either close the door or turn on any lights.47
The court also determined that police behavior while in the
apartment made it clear that the officers entertained no intent to
arrest the defendant or search his apartment.48 The police stayed
only long enough to determine whether the defendant was present
and made no effort to seize any incriminating evidence, including
that located in plain view. 4 9 In addition, the court pointed to the
fact that the defendant was not arrested the following morning
when located at his mother's house.5 0 The court found that these
facts supported the officers' claim to have entered to render medi-
cal assistance.Sl
Finally, the court concluded that a reasonable basis existed
connecting the apartment with the emergency since it was reason-
able to believe that a person shot in the area of his own apartment
would seek cover there.52 Thus the court held that the entrance
into the defendant's apartment was based upon one interest: "pro-
viding Resler with emergency aid, if necessary."5 3
I. ANALYSIS
The generally recognized exceptions to the warrant require-
mentM are utilized in the context of criminal investigation and law
enforcement. 55 In contrast, the emergency exception is employed
45. 209 Neb. at 257, 306 N.W.2d at 923. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
46. 209 Neb. at 257, 306 N.W.2d at 923. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
47. 209 Neb. at 257, 306 N.W.2d at 923-24.
48. Id. at 257, 306 N.W.2d at 924.
49. Id. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. It is not clear why the officers
did not seize the items located in plain view since they apparently would
have been justified in doing so, assuming the entry was lawful. See Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971); supra note 12.
50. 209 Neb. at 257, 306 N.W.2d at 924. See supra notes 27, 34 and accompanying
text.
51. 209 Neb. at 258, 306 N.W.2d at 924.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
55. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (warrantless automobile
search justified to preserve instruments of fruits of crime located in an inher-
ently mobile item); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (warrantless
search incident to arrest allowed because of fear for safety of arresting officer
[Vol. 61:545
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in both criminal and noncriminal contexts.56 It is couched in terms
of paternalism and benevolence and is used to effect the protection
of human life.57 Perhaps the unique, noncriminal aspect of the ex-
ception has furthered its seemingly unqualified acceptance by
lower federal and state courts,58 including the Nebraska Supreme
Court. However, reluctance by the courts to question the use of
the emergency exception because of its relationship to the preser-
vation of human life59 renders the exception a source of potential
and possible loss or destruction of evidence); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 293,
298-99 (1967) (doctrine of hot pursuit allows warrantless searches when to
delay an investigation would endanger the lives of officers or others).
56. For examples of emergency entries made in a criminal context, see Geary v.
State, 91 Nev. 784, 544 P.2d 417 (1975) (police entered apartment after observ-
ing overturned furniture and bloodstains in apartment); State v. Theodoso-
poulous, 119 N.H. 57, 409 A.2d 1134 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980)
(sniper at large in vicinity of police station justified entrance into defendant's
apartment).
For examples of emergency entries made in a noncriminal context, see
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory search without
warrant reasonable after police impounded illegally parked vehicle); Vauss v.
United States, 370 F.2d 250 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (search of appellant justified
where police found him unconscious in public street); Steigler v. Anderson,
360 F. Supp. 1286 (D. DeL 1973), acffd, 496 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1002 (1974) (court upheld police entry into burning house to look for pos-
sible victims); State v. Beede, 119 N.H. 620, 406 A.2d 125 (1979) (woman re-
ported missing did not provide reasonable basis for warrantless search of
defendant's apartment).
57. See Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205,212 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
860 (1963) (alternative holding) ('The need to protect or preserve life or
avoid serious injury is justification for what would otherwise be illegal
.... "); Davis v. State, 236 Md. 389, 396, 204 A.2d 76, 80 (1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 966 (1965) ("The preservation of human life has been considered para-
mount to the constitutional demand of a search warrant as a condition prece-
dent to the invasion of the privacy of a dwelling house.").
58. See supra note 15.
59. In Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963), Chief Justice Burger,
then sitting on the bench of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
discussed the necessity for swift action when police are confronted with a
possible emergency situation:
[A] warrant is not required to break down a door to enter a burning
home to rescue occupants or extinguish a fire, to prevent a shooting
or to bring emergency aid to an injured person. The need to protect
or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would
be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency. Fires or dead
bodies are reported to police by cranks where no fires or bodies are
to be found. Acting in response to reports of 'dead bodies,' the police
may find the 'bodies' to be common drunks, diabetics in shock, or
distressed cardiac patients. But the business of policemen and
firemen is to act, not to speculate or meditate on whether the report
is correct. People could well die in emergencies if police tried to act
with the calm deliberation associated with the judicial process. Even
the apparently dead often are saved by swift police response. A myr-
iad of circumstances could fall within the terms "exigent circum-
1982]
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abuse of established fourth amendment guarantees.
One author has suggested that any exception to the warrant re-
quirement "should be defined so precisely that police officers are
unlikely to believe the exception applies to a situation when it
does not."60 Such specificity would facilitate the successful prose-
cution of valid complaints and protect citizens' demands that their
privacy not be unlawfully invaded by public officials.61 As stated
and applied in State v. Resler, however, the emergency exception
is imprecise and vague, and therefore does not protect either state
or private interests. Specifically, the exception is problematic in
two major respects: (1) the broad scope of the requirement that a
reasonable belief of an emergency exists,62 and (2) the focusing
upon benevolent police intent to determine the legality of a war-
rantless search.63
A. Reasonable Belief an Emergency Exists
The first element of the emergency exception requires that the
police have valid reasons for the belief that an emergency exists.64
Although this element further requires that the police must be-
lieve there is an immediate need for their assistance to protect life
or property,65 this aspect is frequently ignored by the courts in ap-
plying the exception.66
The Resler opinion exemplifies this deficiency in analysis. The
court did not address whether the officers were confronted with
the type of factual situation demanding immediate entry, nor did
stances'... , e.g., smoke coming out a window or under a door, the
sound of gunfire in a house, threats from the inside to shoot through
the door at police, reasonable grounds to believe an injured or seri-
ously ill person is being held within.
... That such an entry would be an intrusion is undoubted but
here we reach the balancing of interests and needs. When police-
men, firemen or other public officers are confronted with evidence
which would lead a prudent and reasonable official to see a need to
act to protect life or property, they are authorized to act on that infor-
mation, even if ultimately found erroneous.
Id. at 212 (citation omitted).
60. Note, Police Practices and the Threatened Destruction of Tangible Evidence,
84 HAxv. L. REV. 1465, 1472 (1971).
61. Id. at 1472-73. Cf. Williamson, The Supreme Court, Warrantless Searches, and
Exigent Circumstances, 31 OKmA. L. REV. 110 (1978), in which the author dis-
cussed the difficulty in arriving at a solution to the various problems facing
courts and law enforcement officials in the application of the fourth amend-
ment warrant requirement exceptions.
62. See infra notes 64-86 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., People v. Brooks, 7 Ill. App. 3d 767, 289 N.E.2d 207 (1972); State v.
Sanders, 8 Wash. App. 306, 506 P.2d 892 (1973).
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the court critically examine the important fact that the defendant
was a prime suspect for several unsolved crimes. These types of
omissions may lead to the following problems in the application of
the emergency exception: (1) there may be directly conflicting re-
sults with respect to the facts which legally constitute an emer-
gency;67 (2) warrantless entries may be upheld based on facts
suggesting trivial medical problems, which are nevertheless cate-
gorized as emergencies; 68 (3) the exception may become an alter-
native to law enforcement officials to use as an investigative device
to gain entry into a suspect's home without a showing of probable
cause or possession of a warrant.69
An examination of the facts in Resler reveals the flexibility in
the determination of an emergency. Although the court upheld the
entry, the focus on different or additional facts could have easily
resulted in a contrary outcome. In summarizing the facts support-
ing the reasonable belief that an emergency existed, the court fo-
cused on the facts that the defendant may have been shot, that he
had fallen to the ground when the gun was fired at him, and that
his apartment door was open without apparent explanation.7 0 Re-
lying only upon these facts, the investigator's belief of an emer-
gency may not have been unreasonable. However, there were
additional relevant facts surrounding the shooting which the court
apparently ignored in determining the reasonable belief of an
emergency. Specifically, the only evidence that the defendant may
have been shot was that he fell to his knees. Significantly, the de-
fendant immediately regained his balance, ran several blocks, and
67. An examination of what might be classified as the "dead body" cases reveals
the extent to which contrary decisions result due to the flexibility in the ele-
ment of emergency. These cases involve situations in which police were
alerted to an "emergency" due to the odor of decomposing flesh. In People v.
Brooks, 7 IIl. App. 3d 767, 289 N.E.2d 207 (1972), police were dispatched to
defendant's residence after reports that defendant's mother was missing, that
an unusual odor existed in the hallway, and that the odor appeared to be
emanating from defendant's apartment. Upon arrival, the officers identified
the odor as that which usually accompanies a dead body. The court deemed
these facts sufficient to create a reasonable belief that an emergency existed
and thereby justified a warrantless entry. Id. at 775, 289 N.E.2d at 213. See
also People v. Lovitz, 39 Ill. App. 3d 624, 350 N.E.2d 276 (1976) (odor of decay-
ing flesh justified an emergency entrance). But see Condon v. People, 176
Colo. 212,489 P.2d 1297 (1971), where the court held that the odor of a decom-
posing body did not justify an emergency entrance. The court found that the
officers had no reason, based only upon belief of an odor of a decomposing
body, to effect a warrantless entry. As the court stated: 'To put the matter
sharply, if there had been a decomposing body, there would be no hope of
revival at any rate." Id. at 219, 489 P.2d at 1300.
68. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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jumped a picket fence, effectively eluding the four persons chasing
him.71 Based upon these facts, the court could have determined
that no "emergency" existed.
This potentially conflicting determination of the existence of an
emergency is not the result of differing factual interpretations, but
rather the result of employing a different set of facts to reach that
determination. The Resler court's focus on one set of facts, to the
exclusion of other, significant facts, provides no guidance for fu-
ture decisions regarding the kinds of facts which are relevant to
the issue of a reasonable belief of an emergency. Furthermore, to
fully protect fourth amendment values, the court should have fo-
cused upon the facts suggesting that an emergency did not exist.
By failing to examine facts contradicting the existence of an emer-
gency, the "reasonableness" of the investigator's belief is not whol-
ly determined.
In determining the existence of an emergency, courts should
also exclude trivial "emergencies" 72 in order to fully protect fourth
amendment guarantees and to avoid possible abuses of warrant-
less entries. Although persons who are not suspects in ongoing
criminal investigations may be subject to the possible abuse of a
warrantless entry based upon facts suggesting a trivial emergency,
the real danger is in the realm of criminal investigation. In the
noncriminal context, law enforcement officials presumably have
less incentive to enter a household in the absence of facts sug-
gesting that a serious emergency may exist. However, in the crimi-
nal context, entry based upon trivial emergency allows police to
effectively avoid the requirement of a judicial determination of
probable cause in situations where the facts do not demonstrate
exigent circumstances. 73
71. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
72. For cases in which the courts found that the facts did not justify an emer-
gency entrance because of a trivial emergency, see People v. Smith, 7 Cal. 3d
282, 496 P.2d 1261, 101 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1972) (entry effected to determine
mother's presence and to see if she would require help in caring for her child
not justified); Brewer v. State, 129 Ga. App. 118, 199 S.E.2d 109 (1973) (com-
plaint of loud noise and music did not create emergency). Cf. State v. Rod-
gers, 573 S.W.2d 710 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (emergency entry into home in
response to report of dead body where search did not begin until premises
were known to be clear not justified).
73. The following cases illustrate police entrances based on the emergency doc-
trine in which the courts found exigent circumstances did not exist: Root v.
Gauper, 438 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1971) (warrantless entry of home by law en-
forcement officials who knew shooting victim had been removed to hospital
not justified); United States v. Davis, 423 F.2d 974 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 836 (1970) (entry and search of premises three and one half hours after
defendant arrested not justified); Nelson v. State, 96 Nev. 363, 609 P.2d 717
(1980) (when sole reason child was unattended was that police had arrested
mother and created need to enter home, no emergency existed); State v.
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For example, in People v. Roberts,7 4 the police were summoned
to investigate the burglary of a music store. The night of the bur-
glary, a suspicious vehicle was seen in the area, and the vehicle
and its owner were identified by a witness. When police arrived at
the suspect's apartment, they were informed by neighbors that the
occupant had been ill. The police received no answer after knock-
ing on the door, but testified that they heard moaning coming from
within the apartment. Their subsequent entry was justified as one
necessary to render medical assistance to the occupant/suspect.75
Thus a trivial emergency, such as illness, was accepted by the
court as a valid justification for avoiding the warrant requirement.
The fact that the occupant was a suspect was not given extra atten-
tion by the court.
Because of the possiblity that the defendant in Resler had sus-
tained a gunshot wound, the case is not as clearly indicative as
Roberts of the way in which a trivial emergency can prompt and
justify avoiding the warrant requirement. However, Resler does
create a question as to the significance which should be attached
to the alleged victim's deliberate avoidance of assistance.7 6 In de-
termining whether a warrantless entry was truly the result of a
reasonable belief in the existence of an emergency, courts should
be wary of a police entry into a dwelling for a supposed medical
emergency, when the victim has made clear that assistance is not
wanted.
The failure of the Nebraska Supreme Court to deal with the is-
sue that the defendant was a suspect in other crimes7 7 enhances
the possibility for abuse in using the emergency exception to jus-
tify warrantless entries. In cases involving known criminal sus-
pects, the courts need to carefully scrutinize the existence of an
emergency. Fourth amendment values are protected by requiring
that probable cause be determined by a "neutral and detached
magistrate... [and not] by the officer engaged in the often com-
petitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 78 If exigent circurn-
Beede, 119 N.H. 620, 406 A.2d 125 (1979) (delay of five hours suggested lack of
exigent circumstances).
74. 47 Cal. 2d 374, 303 P.2d 721 (1956).
75. Having determined that the entry was lawful to render aid, the court upheld
the officers' actions in entering each room to look for the occupant. The occu-
pant was not in the apartment; however, officers located a radio, in plain view,
which matched the description of property stolen in the burglary. Id. at 376,
303 P.2d at 722. The court stated: "The fact that abuses sometimes occur dur-
ing the course of criminal investigations should not give a sinister coloration
to procedures which are basically reasonable." Id. at 380, 303 P.2d at 724.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
77. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
78. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). In Johnson, the Court found
that the officers had probable cause to believe that the defendants were vio-
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stances demand, a search can be conducted without the detached
determination of probable cause, providing, however, that prob-
able cause exists.7 9 When the emergency exception, is employed
to search the home of a criminal suspect, the government is given
an easy opportunity to avoid the probable cause requirement and
the warrant rule. As "[t]he right of officers to thrust themselves
into a home is... [of] grave concern, not only to the individual
but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and
freedom from surveillance,"8 0 the courts must protect citizens
from the use of the emergency entrance to avoid compliance with
fourth amendment requirements. This protection can be ensured
by imposing a greater burden of proof on the government when a
criminal suspect is involved. Other constitutional guarantees have
been deemed important enough to require greater burdens of
proof by the government in order to assure that the rights are
maintained. For example, in the context of the fifth amendment
guarantee against self-incrimination,8 1 the United States Supreme
Court has recognized a presumption against waiver.82 Although
lating federal narcotics laws, yet did not obtain a warrant before entering
their living quarters. The Court declared that the only reasons the officers
did not obtain a warrant were "inconvenience to the officers and some slight
delay necessary to prepare papers." Id. at 15. These circumstances did not
justify a warrantless entry.
79. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925). ("In such cases where
the seizure is impossible except without warrant, the seizing officer acts un-
lawfully and at his peril unless he can show the court probable cause."). See
supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text.
80. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
81. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall [any person]
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. .. ."
82. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda the Court statech 'This
Court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional
rights... and we re-assert these standards as applied to in-custody interro-
gation." Id. at 475. Quoting from Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962),
the Court went on to state: "Presuming waiver from a silent record is imper-
missible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence
which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and under-
standingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver." Id. Miranda es-
tablished protective devices to safeguard against the potential for unlawful
compulsory, self-incrimination during custodial interrogation. Id. at 467. For
earlier cases addressing the waiver of constitutional rights, see Von Moltke v.
Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948) ('To discharge this duty properly in light of
the strong presumption against waiver of the constitutional right to counsel, a
judge must investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the
case before him demand."); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (quot-
ing Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937); Ohio Bell TeL Co. v.
Public Util. Conu'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937)) (" '[Clourts indulge every rea-
sonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights
and ... we 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights.' ").
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warrantless searches or seizures do not require a waiver of one's
rights, case law suggests that when the government is in a position
to subvert constitutional rights, as with the fifth amendment rights,
the government has a greater burden of proof to establish that an
infraction of those rights did not occur.83 The ease with which the
emergency exception allows police entries by subterfuge justifies
placing a presumption against the government and exacting a
greater burden of proof as to the officer's reasonable belief in the
existence of an emergency when the case involves a criminal
suspect.
A second area in which constitutional rights are afforded
greater protection in certain circumstances is in the standards of
review used in due process analysis. The Supreme Court applies
strict scrutiny in examining legislation affecting fundamental con-
stitutional rights.84 Also, in equal protection analysis, the Court
applies strict scrutiny to legislation which discriminates against
certain individuals or groups, i.e., suspect classifications. 85 Strict
scrutiny entails a determination that the classification is "neces-
sary to promote a 'compelling' or 'overriding' interest of govern-
ment."86 Clearly there is ample authority for stricter analysis than
is generally accorded constitutional rights when those rights arise
in situations in which government action can readily subvert the
constitutional protections.
B. The Required Intent
The Nebraska Supreme Court has limited the use of the emer-
gency exception to the extent that the state must prove that the
warrantless entry was induced by benevolent motives rather than
to further criminal investigation.87 This requirement is the court's
83. See cases cited supra notes 78-80, 82.
84. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to marital freedom); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to marital privacy). Funda-
mental rights are given greater protection because "[t]hese are rights which
the Court recognizes as having a value so essential to individual liberty" that
they justify an intrusive standard of review. J. NowAKC, . ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG,
CONsTrrunoNAL LAw 416, 418, 524 (1978).
85. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (classification based on
alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (racial classification). Classifi-
cations based on race and national origin are "suspect." J. NowAx, . Ro-
TuNDA, J. YoUNG, supra note 84,. at 535.
86. J. NOwAK, . ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, supra note 84, at 535. Strict scrutiny is ap-
plied because "[b] urdening someone because of his national origin or status
as a member of a racial minority runs counter to the most fundamental con-
cept of equal protection." Id.
87. See supra notes 44, 48-51 and accomanying text. An opposite result was
reached in State v. Hardin, 90 Nev. 10, 518 P.2d 151 (1974), in which the Ne-
vada Supreme Court sanctioned use of the emergency exception to justify
1982]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
attempt to ensure that the exception complies with the United
States Supreme Court mandate that an exception to the warrant
requirement must be justified by more than a public interest in
stopping or regulating criminal activity.88 The problems in requir-
ing the state to justify a warrantless entry by proving that the of-
ficers entertained the requisite intent are twofold: first, the
interrelationship between the element of emergency and the ele-
ment of intent renders the element of intent useless as a limitation
on abuse;8 9 second, reliance on the element of police intent directs
the court's focus away from factors traditionally utilized in the de-
termination of the validity of fourth amendment exceptions.90
The benevolent intent element does not serve to protect against
police entries by subterfuge9l because of the close connection be-
tween determining whether an emergency existed and whether
the officer entertained the requisite intent. The Resler opinion
demonstrates this problem. In Resler, the elements of emergency
and intent were stated and analyzed separately by the court.92
entry into a locked hotel room during an investigation of a murder that took
place in the hotel. The court suggested that the officers were confronted with
a type of situation in which they reasonably feared the perpetrator was a sub-
stantial threat to life and might kill again if not apprehended. Id. at 15-16, 518
P.2d at 154. The officers knocked on a hotel room door which was located next
to the room in which the murder took place. The occupant did not respond to
the officer's knocking. The court accepted the officers' testimony that they
had obtained a passkey from the hotel manager and entered the room be-
cause they thought it essential to interview the person whose room was lo-
cated next to the murder scene and they did not know if the occupant was
"asleep, drunk, or merely attempting to avoid visitors." Id. at 12, 518 P.2d at
152. Thus, the emergency exception justified entry into a private area to pro-
tect persons from the possibility of future criminal activity.
88. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), where the Supreme Court refused
to recognize Arizona's proposed "murder scene exception." Arizona argued
that the scene of a murder could be justifiably searched without warrant be-
cause a murder investigation requires immediate action and the crime of
murder is extremely serious. Id. at 392-93. The Court rejected these argu-
ments, stating:
[T]he mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient
can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment. The
investigation of crime would always be simplified if warrants were
unnecessary. But the Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those
who wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person's home and
property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum sim-
plicity in enforcement of the criminal law.
Id. at 393 (citations omitted).
89. See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
91. "The subterfuge characterization may result from the finding that the pur-
ported reason for entry ... was in fact only an excuse to gain access for the
dominant purpose of finding evidence." 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 617(d), at 491 (1978).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 44-51.
[Vol. 61:545
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
The facts relevant to the intent issue were that the officers at the
scene did not immediately enter the defendant's apartment;
rather, they notified an investigator of the evening's events in ac-
cordance with the investigator's previous request.93 These facts
suggest that the police decision to enter the defendant's apartment
may have been influenced by their previous suspicions regarding
the defendant. The Nebraska court did not discuss this possibility
in its analysis of the intent element. Rather, the court emphasized
that the police activity after entering the apartment supported
their claimed motive for entering. The court found that because
the police did nothing illegal after entering the defendant's apart-
ment and postponed arresting the defendant until after conducting
a search pursuant to a warrant, they harbored the proper
noninvestigative motive.94 It is not readily apparent why police
conduct after entering the apartment was deemed more significant
than police conduct and knowledge before making the decision to
enter. A more logical approach to determining police intent in
making the entry would be to focus on police behavior prior to the
entrance. Behavior such as a delay in entry would seem significant
in determining whether the police entered with the intent to
render emergency medical aid or to investigate.
Despite the Resler court's formal separation of the emergency
and intent elements, its analysis suggests that once the determina-
tion has been made that an emergency existed, the determination
of intent is easily disposed of, regardless of the facts surrounding
the entry.9 5 This approach has the undesirable result of broaden-
ing the availability of the emergency doctrine to effect warrantless
entries for criminal investigation.
Although a separate examination of the two elements could fa-
cilitate the recognition of situations in which the emergency en-
.trance was not justified, this alternative does not totally satisfy
concerns for government abuses of fourth amendment protections.
Cross-examination of a police officer to determine his intent in ef-
fecting a warrantless entry is unlikely to result in a confession of
an attempt to avoid the probable cause requirement. A more suita-
ble approach would be to recognize that benevolent intent is irrele-
vant for purposes of justifying use of this exception to the fourth
93. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
94. See 209 Neb. at 257, 306 N.W.2d at 924; supra notes 48-51 and accompanying
text. It would seem that the delay in arrest was necessary in order to con-
clude the search upon which the arrest warrant was issued.
95. While this result may be questionable in the criminal context, in the non-
criminal context it would be unusual for a court to ever determine improper
intent after determining an emergency existed. In the noncriminal context,
nothing in the record could suggest any motive other than to render emer-
gency aid.
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amendment warrant requirement. 96
One commentator has suggested that "[w] hile 'improper' moti-
vation has been recognized as a factor in declaring a search uncon-
stitutional, there seems to be little justification for applying the
other side of the coin and rewarding a 'noble' motive by lessening
the protection of the fourth amendment."97 Rather, "[i]t is the in-
dividual's interest in privacy which the [Fourth] Amendment pro-
tects, and that would not appear to fluctuate with the 'intent' of the
invading officers."98 An examination of the established exceptions
to the warrant requirement 99 suggests that two factors are impor-
tant in determining whether searches are within the boundaries of
an exception. These two factors are: (1) the officers must be
presented with a situation in which there is a legitimate need to
search, and (2) the situation must be one in which obtaining a war-
rant would frustrate the purpose of the search.100
96. See generally Bacigal, The Emergency Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 9
U. RiCH. L. REv. 249 (1975).
97. Id. at 269 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469-70 n.26 (1971).
In Coolidge, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that evidence ob-
tained as a result of a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle was admis-
sible under the plain view doctrine. One requirement of the doctrine of plain
view, as enunciated in a plurality opinion by Justice Stewart, is that the dis-
covery be inadvertent. Id. at 469-71. Thus, if police have an improper motive
such as knowing in advance the location of evidence and intending to seize it,
the evidence seized, although in plain view, will be inadmissible. Id.
The limitation may have some significance to an emergency entrance ar-
guably effected to avoid the requirement of probable cause. The importance
of the doctrine of inadvertent plain view in that context would ultimately de-
pend upon the degree of expectation permitted in order for the discovery to
be inadvertent. For a general discussion of the divergent views on possible
degrees required, see Comment, "Plain View"--Anything But Plain: Coo-
lidge Divides the Lower Courts, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 489, 510 (1974).
98. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 255 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting), cited
with approval in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 n.6 (1967).
99. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
100. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), wherein the Court stated:
In Warden v. Hayden... we recognized the right of police, who had
probable cause to believe that an armed robber had entered a house
a few minutes before, to make a warrantless entry to arrest the rob-
ber and to search for weapons .... Once Santana saw the police,
there Was likewise a realistic expectation that any delay would result
in the destruction of evidence.
Id. at 42-43 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also Chambers v. Ma-
roney, 399 U.S. 42, 50-51 (1970) (emphasis added) ("[T]he circumstances that
furnish probable cause to search a particular auto for particular articles are
most often unforeseeable; moreover, the opportunity to search is fleeting
since a car is readily movable."); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (emphasis
added) (" [W] e deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct-necessarily
sift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on
the beat-which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not
be, subjected to the warrant procedure."); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
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The state's interest underlying the emergency exception is the
necessity to preserve human life.1Ol Admittedly, this is a legiti-
mate interest. Therefore, if a reasonable belief exists that this in-
terest can be protected, the state will have met its burden of
establishing a legitimate need to search. In addition, however, the
state must prove that this interest would be frustrated if the of-
ficers were to delay rather than make immediate entry. This re-
quirement further tightens the element of emergency. If a
criminal suspect is involved, the court should apply even stricter
scrutiny.102 Applying these factors would rid the court of the ne-
cessity of deciding the legality of an entrance based only upon the
ambiguity of emergency and the subjective intent of a police
officer.
IV. CONCLUSION
The recent Supreme Court case of Mincey v. Arizona103 reaf-
firmed the necessity of the warrant requirement. 04 To preserve
the policy of the warrant requirement that the decision whether to
search is best made by a neutral magistrate, 05 exceptions to the
warrant requirement need to be carefully and narrowly stated and
applied.
The Nebraska Supreme Court recognized that fourth amend-
ment protections were at stake in Resler,0 6 but the circumstances
under which it adopted the emergency exception to the warrant
requirement revealed a willingness to weaken the protections in
favor of a broadly defined emergency, with benevolent police in-
tent. Additionally, the court failed to address the possibility of ex-
ploitation of the exception in the criminal investigation context.
"A paternalistic notion that a complaining citizen's constitutional
rights can be violated so long as the State is somehow helping him
is alien to our Nation's philosophy."'0 7 Whether the circumstances
surrounding the warrantless entrance are criminal or noncriminal,
the court must carefully guard fourth amendment protections.
Gail V. Perry '83
132, 156 (1925) (emphasis added) ("In cases where seizure is impossible ex-
cept without a warrant, the seizing officer acts unlawfully and at his peril
unless he can show the court probable cause.").
101. Wayne v. United States, 3i8 F.2d 205, 212 (1963) (alternative holding).
102. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
103. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
104. Id. at 390. See supra note 88.
105. See supra note 4.
106. 209 Neb. at 253, 306 N.W.2d at 921; see supra text accompanying notes 37-44.
107. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 343 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1982]

